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INTRODUCTION

A patent's claims define the invention. 1 The United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) examines the invention to determine its patentability,
and if the Office issues a patent on the invention, the same claims may be
scrutinized in a district court to determine whether the patent is enforceable and
valid. 2 The process of interpreting claims, not surprisingly, plays a critical role in
both examination by the USPTO and litigation in the courts. A claim's meaning
must be known in order to determine whether the claimed invention is novel and
non-obvious, or whether someone else is practicing the invention. Accordingly,
the way in which claims are interpreted-the methodology that is employed-is
a constant focus of the judiciary, scholars, and attorneys. In fact, some
commentators identify the difficulty in determining a claim's meaning as one of
the primary reasons the patent system is broken. 3
Interestingly, although there has been much commentary on claim
interpretation methodology in general, no one has fully explored the propriety of
the unique claim interpretation doctrine that the USPTO employs to interpret
every claim in every patent application. 4 The courts instruct the USPTO to give
every applied-for claim its "broadest reasonable interpretation" (BRI) during
patent examination. 5 Everyone seems to have accepted this dichotomy-that a
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention."); White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47,
52 (1886) ("The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very
purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his invention is .... ").
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 131, 281-282 (2006).
See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 8-11 (2008).
While not directly discussing the validity of the USPTO's use of the broadest
reasonable interpretation standard in interpreting patent claims, Michael
Risch has explored whether the USPTO's current claim construction
methodology helps or hinders the public notice function of patent claims.
See Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 179, 192-200 (2007) (concluding that the standard employed
inhibits public notice of claim scope); see also Joel Miller, Claim Construction
at the PTO - The "Broadest Reasonable Interpretation . . . ", 88 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 279 (2006) (describing the broadest reasonable
interpretation standard).

In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
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different claim interpretation methodology should be used in examination than
that which is used in enforcement actions.6
Nevertheless, interpreting a claim's meaning differently-depending on
the venue in which the interpretation takes place-requires some justification.
Given that the BRI standard plays a role in every applied-for patent, the
propriety of the BRI standard needs to be explored. An examination of the BRI
standard has become even more important given the standard's foundational
role in a recent precedential opinion of the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (Board).7
This article does what is long overdue: it fully explores the validity of the
BRI standard. The previously articulated rationales behind the BRI standard are
severely lacking. Not only does the BRI standard fail to provide the advantages
touted by the courts that created the standard, the standard is contrary to both
the patent statutes and the concept of a unitary patent system. It allows
examiners to avoid difficult claim interpretation issues; it leads to improper and
uncorrectable denials of patent protection; and it is incurably ambiguous. Given
that the BRI standard is severely lacking, the courts and the USPTO should
abandon it and utilize a single, consistent claim interpretation methodology
throughout the patent system.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II describes the BRI standard
and the traditional justifications for the standard. Part III details objections to the
standard, and discusses why the commonly offered justifications do not hold up
under critical analysis. Finally, Part IV uses three recent Federal Circuit cases
employing the BRI standard as examples of what is wrong with the BRI
standard.
II.

DESCRIPTION OF THE "BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION"
STANDARD

A.

Operation of the BRI Standard

During the examination process at the USPTO, the Office gives pending
claims their BRI pursuant to "decades old case law." 8 The Federal Circuit, its

See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
See ex parte Miyazaki, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207, 1211 (B.P.A.1. 2008).
Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027. The USPTO also
applies the BRI standard in reexamination proceedings, In re Swanson, 540
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predecessor court-the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)-and the
USPTO have all consistently applied the BRI standard to the interpretation of
patent claims during prosecution.9 The use and unique application of the BRI
standard by the US PTO is well established, as articulated by the CCPA in the
1953 case, In re Kebrich:
Whatever may be the practice of the courts in the interpretation
of claims in infringement proceedings in order to sustain patents
once granted, it is very definitely settled by a line of consistent
decisions rendered during a long period of time that in the initial
consideration of the question of patentability neither the
tribunals of the Patent Office nor the courts in reviewing their
action may properly read unexpressed limitations into claims,
and it is equally as well settled that, so limited, the tribunals and
the reviewing courts in the initial consideration of patentability
will give claims the broadest interpretation which, within
reason, may be applied. 10
The Federal Circuit has recently approved the use of the BRI standard in
Phillips v. A WH Corp., an en bane decision addressing claim interpretation. 11 The
specifics of the standard, as explained by the Federal Circuit in In re Morris, are
as follows:
[A]s an initial matter, the [US]PTO applies to the verbiage of the
proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words
in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of

F.3d 1368, 1377-78, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2008), as well
as in reissue proceedings, In re Reuter, 670 F.2d 1015, 1019, 210 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 249, 253 (C.C.P.A. 1981).

See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1581, 1583, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1436, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Sweet, 393 F.2d 837, 841-42, 157
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 495, 499 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Tibbals, 316 F.2d 955, 958, 137
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 565, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1963); In re Kebrich, 201 F.2d 951, 954, 96
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 411, 414 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (articulating the broadest reasonable
interpretation standard).
10

201 F.2d at 954, 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 414.

11

415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
bane). The Federal Circuit has rejected the argument that decisions such as
Markman v. Westview Instruments have overruled the standard. Morris, 127
F.3d at 1053-54, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027-28.
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ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever
enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be
afforded by the written description contained in the applicant's
specification.12
The BRI standard is commonly accompanied by the additional qualifier
"consistent with the specification" or similar verbiage. 13 The Federal Circuit
explains this qualifier as a further explanation of a "reasonable" interpretation one that does not "ignore any interpretative guidance afforded by the applicant's
written description."14
The BRI standard creates a different and unique interpretation
methodology for the USPTO compared to the methodology used by district
courts to interpret issued claims (the post-grant methodology). 1s The Federal
Circuit has held it to be reversible error for the USPTO to apply the post-grant
methodology. 16 The USPTO must use the BRI standard. 17
Additionally, the Federal Circuit applies a different standard of appellate
review to USPTO interpretations of pending claims than it does to district court
interpretations of issued claims. Since its decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit has upheld the de novo standard of review
for district court interpretations of issued claims. 18 In contrast, the Federal
Circuit reviews claim interpretations by the USPTO under a "reasonableness"
standard, which is consistent with the BRI standard applied in the USPTO
~

12

127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027.

13

See id.

14

See id.

15

Id. at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027-28.

16

In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1320, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir.
1989). Although the Federal Circuit, in In re Zietz, found that the Board had
committed a serious error by applying the wrong interpretation standard
and took the time to reprimand the Board and explain this error, id., the
court ultimately affirmed the board's decision because the error was deemed
irrelevant to the outcome due to collateral estoppel. Id. at 324, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1324.

17

Id. at 321-22, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1321-22.

18

See 138 F.3d 1448, 1454, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
bane).

2009

Unreasonableness of Broadest Reasonable Interpretation Standard

291

setting. 19 Under this "reasonableness" standard of review, the Federal Circuit
gives the USPTO's interpretations under the BRI standard deference.zo In
contrast, it gives district court interpretations of issued claims none. 21

B.

Articulated Rationales Behind the BRI Standard
1.

Reduces the Likelihood that an Issued Claim is
Subsequently Interpreted More Broadly

The major justification for the BRI standard is that "[g]iving claims their
broadest reasonable construction 'serves the public interest by reducing the
possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is
justified."'22 Using the BRI standard during prosecution allows the patent system
to "hedge its bets." In other words, the BRI standard allows the USPTO to
consider the full range of reasonable claim interpretations that a claim could be
given. Then, once a patent issues, the public may assume that the USPTO' s
review for patentability encompassed any reasonable interpretation of the
claim(s) done either by a district court or by another patent observer. 23
The standard allegedly helps the USPTO avoid erroneously blessing a
claim as patentable when a district court may construe the same claim more
broadly than the USPTO had considered, with the resulting increase in scope
capturing prior art or an obvious variation of the prior art. 24 Thus, the BRI
standard helps avoid a Type I error-an incorrect finding by the USPTO that the

19

Morris, 127 F.3d at 1055, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028-29.

20

See id.

21

See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1454, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172. This lack of
deference for district court interpretations is a point of contention. See, e.g.,
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330-31, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J., dissenting) ("Now more than ever I am
convinced of the futility, indeed the absurdity, of this court's persistence in
adhering to the falsehood that claim construction is a matter of law devoid
of any factual component.").

22

In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1827, 1830 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571, 222
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 934, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see also In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393,
1404-05, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541, 550 (C.C.P.A. 1969).

23

See Am. Acad., 367 F.3d at 1364, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830.

24

See Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1571-72, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 936.

292

AIPLAQ.J.

Vol. 37:285

claims are patentable when a district court's interpretation would actually render
them anticipated or non-obvious. 25

2.

Claims can be Amended During Prosecution

A second argument offered in support of the BRI standard is that, in
contrast to litigation, claims are open to amendment during prosecution. 26
Therefore, "[a]pplicants' interests are not impaired [by the BRI standard] since
they are not foreclosed from obtaining appropriate coverage for their invention
with express claim language." 27 Presumably, the applicant can fix the examiner's
interpretation of the claims by amending or arguing the claim whose meaning is
in dispute.
The Federal Circuit has stated that the BRI standard "promotes the
development of [a] written record before the [US]PTO that provides the requisite
written notice to the public as to what the applicant claims as the invention." 28
This record helps identify the claimed invention because "during patent
prosecution when claims can be amended, ambiguities should be recognized,
scope and breadth of language explored, and clarification imposed." 29 Amending
in response to broad interpretations also allows the applicant to "amend the
claims to obtain protection commensurate with his actual contribution to the

25

A "Type I error" is a false-positive-in this context, a false finding of
patentability; a "Type II error" is a false-negative-in this context is a false
finding of unpatentability. See, e.g., Ian Ayers & Katharine K. Baker, A
Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 599, 639-40 (2005) (discussing
Type I and Type II errors in the context of criminal law). See infra Part III.D
for more discussion of Type II errors.

26

See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2006) (indicating that an applicant can amend in
response to an examiner's rejection); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Quiqq, 822
F.2d 1581, 1583, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("Patent
application claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation during
examination proceedings, for the simple reason that before a patent is
granted the claims are readily amended as part of the examination
process."); Prater, 415 F.2d at 1404-05, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 550.

27

Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1571, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 936.

28

29

In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
See In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1320, 1322 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
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art." 30 As such, purported justifications of the BRI standard arise from the
possibility of amending. Amending the claims not only appears to take the sting
away from the BRI standard, but also is beneficial due to the resulting certainty
and narrowness in claim scope, thus bringing claims more in line with what the
applicant actually invented. 31

3.

No Presumption of Validity Exists During Prosecution

The Federal Circuit and CCP A also attempt to justify the BRI standard
by pointing to the fact that, during examination, patent applications do not enjoy
the presumption of validity afforded to issued patents. 32 Once the examiner
rejects the application, "the burden of production falls upon the applicant to
establish entitlement to a patent."33 Rejections under the BRI standard seemingly
force the applicant to prove that her invention is worthy of patent protection.34
Responses to rejections and amendments to clarify claim meaning are part of this
process. 35 Thus, the BRI is further justified because it facilitates this necessary
exchange and provides the public with notice of the scope of the invention before
the presumption of validity attaches. 36

Ill.

PROBLEMS WITH THE BRI STANDARD

Although the BRI standard has been applied for quite some time, this
standard has never been substantively questioned or vetted. 37 In fact, the Board

30

See Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404 n.30, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541, 550 n.30
(C.C.P.A. 1969).

31

See Zietz, 893 F.2d at 321-22, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322.

32

See, e.g., Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027-28.

33

Id. at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1028 (BNA).

34

See id.

35

See Zietz, 893 F.2d at 321-22, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322.

36

See Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027-28.

37

This standard, however, was questioned by an ABA Section of Intellectual
Property Law subcommittee, chaired by an author of this article, that
produced a report recommending that the BRI standard be abandoned. See
Determining Patentability of a Claim in a Patent Application, 2008 AB.A. SEC. OF
INTELL. PROP. L. REP. 108-3, available at http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/
annual2008/business-session/108-3. pdf.
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recently reaffirmed the use of the BRI standard in a significant indefiniteness
holding.3s
The following section articulates a number of fundamental problems
resulting from the use of a different standard to interpret claims during
prosecution from the standard applied to interpret issued claims. The BRI
standard is inconsistent with the plain language of the patent statutes, is contrary
to the unitary patent system established by the creation of the Federal Circuit,
allows examiners to hide from tough claim interpretation questions, results in
incorrect denials of patent protection, and is hopelessly vague.
These
inconsistencies, contradictions, and denials illustrate that none of the previously
articulated justifications for the differences in the standards hold true.
A.

The BRI Standard Is Inconsistent with the Patent Statutes

The identical statutory requirements for patentability and validity, 39
which the USPTO applies during examination, 40 are applied by district courts
during litigation. 41 These statutory requirements focus on the patentability (or
validity, in the case of an issued patent) of an "invention,"42 which is defined by
the patent's claims. 43 The same term, "invention," is also used in 35 U.S.C. § 271
to define the scope of exclusivity that an issued patent affords the patent
holder. 44 The use of the term "invention" does not change throughout Title 35;
and nothing in the statute suggests that its definition should vary between
validity considerations and infringement considerations, or between examination
and litigation. 45 Sections 101, 102, 103, and 112-defining the requirements for

38

See ex parte Miyazaki, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207, 1211 (B.P.A.I. 2008).

39

35 u.s.c. §§ 101-103, 112 (2006).

40

Id.§ 131.

41

Id. §§ 151, 282. In addition to district courts, the definitions are applied by
the International Trade Commission during 337 enforcement actions. See 19
U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2006).

42

35 u.s.c. §§ 101-103, 112.

43

Id. § 112, 'II 2.

44

Id.§ 271(a).

45

See id.§§ 101-103, 112, 131, 151, 282.
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patent protection-apply to both determinations of patentability during
prosecution and to inquiries into validity during litigation. 46
The patent statutes therefore establish a singular concept of "invention,"
which is defined by one or more claims that are reviewed for patentability at the
USPTO and define a right to exclude that is enforceable in district court. 47 The
case law also describes this singular view of invention. 48 Patent examiners must
examine each patent claim to determine its patentability. 49 The Office then issues
patents on those claims that meet the patentability standards, 50 and the patentee
can enforce the issued claims in district courts. 51
Using the BRI standard only during examination and not during
enforcement proceedings violates this statutorily coded concept of a singular
invention. Under the current mode of interpretation, the USPTO examines the
patentability of one invention, construing the claims under the unique BRI
methodology. 52 Once the USPTO issues the patent, the district court may be
called upon to review the validity of, and give exclusivity for, a different
invention-the scope of the invention now defined by claims interpreted through
the post-grant methodology-a methodology that is not glossed by the BRI
requirement. 53 The applicability of differing interpretation standards necessarily
means that the scope of a claim could be different at issuance from the scope

46

See id.

47

See id. §§ 131, 281.

48

See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 34, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459,
473 (1966) ("[T]he patentee obtained his patent only by accepting the
limitations imposed by the Examiner. The claims were carefully drafted to
accept these limitations and [the patent holder] is not now free to assert a
broader view of [the] invention. The subject matter as a whole reduces,
then, to the distinguishing features clearly incorporated into the claims.").

49

See 35 U.S.C. § 131.

50

Id.§ 151.

51

Id.§ 271 (defining what actions a patentee can take in court when a patent is
infringed); see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 34, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 473 (stating
that courts scrutinize the same invention whose claims and scope were
defined during examination).

52

In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir.
1997)

53

See id.
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determined during enforcement, which would establish different "inventions" for
the same claim.
The possibility of such a result violates the unitary nature of "invention"
set forth in the patent statutes. The USPTO must judge the patentability of the
very same invention whose validity a district court will enforce. 54 The BRI
standard flies in the face of this required outcome; in fact, it instructs examiners
to examine a potentially broader invention than that which a district court will
enforce.
Concededly, not all patent laws are applied in the same way during
examination as they are during enforcement actions. Notably, the strong
presumption of validity, which is applicable to an issued patent during
litigation, 55 does not apply to a patent application during examination. 56 In
addition, the examiner does not have to establish unpatentability of a pending
patent claim by clear and convincing evidence, which is the threshold an alleged
infringer must meet to establish the invalidity of an asserted patent claim in
defense of an infringement action.57
The act of examination and issuance is what creates the presumption of
validity in the first place, and it follows that the examiner works unconstrained

54

ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 200
(2004) ("When considering patentability and infringement issues, courts and
[US]PTO examiners turn to the particular wording of the invention as
claimed.").

55

35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").

56

In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en
bane) (finding that the presumption of validity does not apply to
proceedings before the USPTO and noting, in addition, that patents in
reexamination do not enjoy the same presumption of validity).

57

See id.; SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng'g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 1357, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("Under the patent statutes, a patent enjoys
a presumption of validity, see 35 U.S.C. § 282, which can be overcome only
through facts supported by clear and convincing evidence.").
The
presumption is not without its critics, however. See Doug Lichtman & Mark
A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV.
45, 46-47 (2007).
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by any presumption.ss The purpose of examination is to take the first pass on the
issue of validity- i.e., to determine the patentability of the pending claim(s). 59
The fact that the examiner makes the initial determination on validity,
whereas a district court looks at an already-examined claim, may justify some
amount of deference by the district court to the USPTO' s findings. 60 This
reasoning, however, does not extend far enough to justify interpreting inventions
differently based on the forum (being either the USPTO or a district court) where
the interpretation takes place. The same invention that is the subject of
examination forms the basis for enforcement proceedings in district court. 61 It
does not make sense to vary a claim's meaning-and in tum, the definition of the
invention-due to the fact that, during examination, patentability has yet to be
determined.
In fact, the concept of a presumption of validity necessitates a singular
understanding of an invention. If, because different standards of interpretation
are applied, a different invention is deemed to exist during enforcement than
exists during prosecution, the rationale behind the presumption of validity does
not hold true.62 The district courts cannot presume that the USPTO has already
deemed the claimed invention valid because the USPTO looks at an invention
defined by the BRI standard, which, in theory, is a broader invention-and
therefore a different invention-than that which the district courts use. It may
make some sense for subsequent venues to defer to previous adjudicative bodies
on the issue of validity, but claim meaning and, in tum, the definition of an
invention, must remain static between venues for such deference to be justified. 63

58

See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 57, at 52 ("First, the presumption of
validity forces courts to defer to the expertise of the [US]PTO, thereby
avoiding redundant and possibly inferior second looks by the courts.
Presumptions are used throughout the law for precisely this reason.").

59

See id. at 46.

60

Id. at 51-54. However, the current low quality of examination, amongst
other factors, brings this strong presumption into question. Id.

61

35 u.s.c. §§ 131, 281 (2006).

62

Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 57, at 53-56.

63

The doctrine of equivalents does allow the claim scope to vary postissuance. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 4041, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1876 (1997). However, the Supreme Court
suggests that examiners consider even the equivalents of claims under
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The BRI Standard Is Contrary to the Unitary Appellate
Structure of the Patent System

Congress created the Federal Circuit, in part, to establish uniformity in
the substantive patent law applied in USPTO proceedings and district court
patent litigation proceedings. 64
Prior to the court's institution, different
standards could apply in different venues because different appellate courts
independently reviewed decisions from these venues.6s This lack of uniformity
resulted in varying interpretations of the patent laws. 66 The creation of a single
appellate court and, in turn, a singular body of appellate law, over both the
USPTO and all district courts, created horizontal equity, which ensures, for
example, that the same obviousness standard applied during examination also
applies during enforcement actions. 67 Without such horizontal equity, there
would be uncertainty as to one's patent rights. 68 For example, the USPTO, with

examination. Id. at 32, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 ("And if the [US]PTO
has been requesting changes in claim language without the intent to limit
equivalents or, indeed, with the expectation that language it required would
in many cases allow for a range of equivalents, we should be extremely
reluctant to upset the basic assumptions of the [US]PTO without substantial
reason for doing so.").
64

See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System,
Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195,
369-71, 373-74 (1976). But see Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking
Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619, 1675 (2007)
(questioning whether the Federal Circuit has been a successful experiment).

65

The CCP A had exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of rejected applications
from the USPTO while the appropriate regional circuit courts reviewed
patent infringement decisions. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1989).

66

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467 (1966)
(noting the varying nonobviousness standard and stating that the Court had
"observed a notorious difference between the standards [of patentability]
applied by the Patent Office and by the courts").

67

See Dreyfuss, supra note 65, at 8.

68

See Christopher A. Cotropia, "Arising Under" Jurisdiction and Uniformity in
Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 305 (2003) ("With the
creation of the Federal Circuit, the same appellate law governed the USPTO
and federal district court patent cases. The same rule of law applied to a
patent before the USPTO and a patent in federal court, creating a degree of
horizontal equity.").
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one set of standards, may think that an application is directed to patentable
subject matter; whereas, a district court, with a different set of standards, could
disagree. The court's disagreement would not be with the USPTO's application
of the law, but rather with the actual interpretation of the law on a given patent
issue. 69 The Federal Circuit removes this inequity and instills a level of certainty
to patent rights.7o
The BRI standard disrupts the horizontal equity that the creation of the
By introducing an interpretation
Federal Circuit aimed to establish.
methodology unique to the USPTO, the Federal Circuit applies a different claim
interpretation doctrine in USPTO appeals than in district court appeals. 71 The
substantive law of claim interpretation varies depending on the venue. 72 This
variation in interpretation methodology makes it possible for claims to have
variable meanings depending on the venue of the court interpreting the claims.
Accordingly, between the USPTO and the district courts, a patentee's
rights may vary as the claim meaning varies. Such an occurrence is particularly
likely with the BRI standard given that claim meaning is the fundamental, first
step in determining questions of patentability and the scope of exclusivity. 73 This

69

For example, prior to the Federal Circuit's creation, regional circuits
disagreed with each other about the patentability of business methods. See
id. at 301-02 ("Some regional circuits also held that business methods were
not patentable statutory subject matter, coming to an opposite conclusion to
that of the Federal Circuit.") (footnote omitted).

70

Dreyfuss, supra note 65, at 8; Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit "Choice of
Law": Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1196 (1996).

71

See supra Part III.A

72

This situation recreates the problem the Federal Circuit was designed to
solve: different treatment in different forums due to different interpretations
of the law. See Schaffner, supra note 70, at 1196.

73

See TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126,
1139, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Our validity analysis
is a two-step procedure: 'The first step involves the proper interpretation of
the claims. The second step involves determining whether the limitations of
the claims as properly interpreted are met by the prior art."' (quoting
Beachcombers, Int'!, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154,
1160, 31U.S.P.Q.2d1653, 1660 (Fed. Cir. 1994))); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs.,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
bane) ("An infringement analysis involves two steps. First, the court
determines the scope and meaning of the patent claims asserted, and then
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difference in treatment injects uncertainty into the beginning of the patent
process because the meanings of patent claims vary due to venue and, in turn,
the questions of validity and infringement, which build off claim meaning, vary
as well. The same patent is not treated the same in different venues; the BRI
standard explicitly makes this the case and it, as a result, violates the concept of
horizontal equity.74
Again, evidentiary standards applied in the two venues differ when
determining questions of validity. 75 As explained in Part Ill.A., however, the
difference in standards-specifically the existence of a presumption of validity in
district court-makes structural sense, while the BRI standard does not.76
The BRI Standard Allows Examiners and the Federal Circuit to

C.

Skirt Tough Claim Interpretation Issues
The BRI standard also allows examiners to avoid tough claim
interpretation issues. It explicitly does not require the examiner to determine the
correct claim interpretation. 77 Instead, examiners just need to give the claim a
"reasonable" interpretation. This means that examiners never need to resolve on
paper the difficult "read the claims in light of the specification, but do not read
the limitations from the specification into the claims" conundrum faced in almost
every claim interpretation inquiry. 78 Most importantly, the applicant does not
have to respond to such analysis. Prosecution history as to whether limitation
"A" from the specification should be read into the claims is never created because
the BRI standard prevents the conversation from ever happening. The public is
then robbed of discussions of claim meaning that could assist in future
interpretation. These discussions are tailored to the actual methodology courts
will apply when interpreting the claims in litigation.

the properly construed claims are compared to the allegedly infringing
device." (citations omitted)).

74

See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.

75

See supra Part III.A.

76

Id.

77

78

In other words, the BRI explicitly forecloses any need to find a "correct
interpretation."

See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and
Their Claim Scope Paradigm, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 81 (2005).
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The case law actually celebrates this fact by arguing that the USPTO
should err on examining a broader claim because a district court may later give
the claim a similar broad construction. 79 Put another way, the unique standard in
the prosecution context tilts examination toward a broader claim just in case
district courts will apply such a broad construction.
This argument makes some dangerous assumptions. It assumes that
examiners and district courts are unlikely to arrive at the same interpretation
under the current claim interpretation rubric. If this assumption is true, then
there is no reason to believe an examiner would arrive at a correct, broadest
interpretation under the BRI standard. Examiners are just as likely to misapply
the BRI standard as they are to misapply the interpretation standard used in the
litigation process.
If anything, the addition of another layer to claim
interpretation procedure injects more uncertainty and unpredictability into the
process, making it even more likely that the USPTO will interpret claims
differently than district courts.
Adding another interpretation step- determining the BRI after
discerning the standard claim meaning-just creates another opportunity for like
minds to differ. If a difference in the resulting interpretation by the USPTO and
the district courts is so likely that an express doctrine is needed to compensate
for it, then a deeper-rooted problem exists. The real problem is the lack of
certainty and predictability in claim construction. 80 The real change should
therefore be to the underlying claim interpretation methodology, not the
addition of a BRI gloss at the USPT0. 81 The BRI standard, at best, only hides a
more fundamental problem of claim construction. The better solution is to attack
that problem head-on instead of creating a doctrine to compensate for the base
doctrine's shortcomings.
One could argue, as the Board did recently in Ex parte Miyazaki, that the
BRI standard facilitates definiteness in claim meaning. 82 In Miyazaki, the Board

79

See, e.g., In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541, 550
(C.C.P.A. 1969).

80

See, e.g., Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim
Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1143 (2001).

81

For example, decreasing information costs may help the interpretation
process.
See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and
Information Costs, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 90 (2005).

82

See 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207, 1211 (B.P.A.I. 2008).
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laid out a new lower standard for indefiniteness, partially grounded in the BRI
standard. 83 The BRI standard assumes that a claim can be "amenable to two or
more plausible claim constructions," and so "the USPTO is justified in requiring
the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed
invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as indefinite."84
The Board's reasoning misses the point. The Board is correct that the BRI
standard is premised, at least in part, on the assumption that claim interpretation
is difficult and that like minds can reach different conclusions. This assumption
is, however, faulty if it supports different claim-interpretation processes at the
USPTO and in district courts. Again, if claim interpretation as currently
articulated is difficult and embroiled in uncertainty, Congress should fix it all the
way around. 85 Notably, this point is not an indictment of the Miyazaki holding,
which is better grounded, as the Board recognized, in the lack of a presumption
of validity than in the BRI standard.BG

The BRI Standard Results in Improper Denial of Patent
Protection

D.

The BRI standard also creates the possibility that the USPTO will
improperly reject a patent claim. Under the standard, the USPTO does not
review an application pursuant to the normal meaning of the pending claims in
that the USPTO does not use the traditional claim interpretation methodology
applied in district court. 87 Instead, as the BRI standard requires, examiners give

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

It is possible that the fix will involve using the BRI standard in both the

USPTO and in district courts rather than abandoning the BRI standard
altogether.
86

See Miyazaki, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212 ("'If this case were before an
examiner, the examiner might well be justified in demanding that the
applicant more clearly define [specific claim language], and thereby remove
any degree of ambiguity. However, we are faced with an issued patent that
enjoys a presumption of validity."' (quoting Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v.
United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1384, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1272, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).

87

See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1027 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); In re Kebrich, 201 F.2d 951, 954, 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 411, 414
(C.C.P.A. 1953).
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claims their "broadest" interpretation. 88 Claim scope, as interpreted by the
USPTO, therefore has the possibility of encompassing more subject matter than
the claim captures when interpreted and enforced in district court.89 This
differential is shown in Figure 1 below.
Claim Scope
UnderUSPTO
Methodology
Claim Scope Under
District Coun
Methodology

Figure 1
Claim Scope under Different Interpretation Methodologies
Figure 1 contrasts the resulting scope under the two methodologies. The
requirement that the USPTO give the claim language its "broadest" reasonable
interpretation necessarily contemplates a larger resulting claim scope than a
district court would determine under the normal interpretation methodology
without the "broadest" lens.
The complete scope of a pending claim must be patentable to be worthy
of patent protection.9o The broader the claim, the more likely the USPTO will
hold it to be unpatentable. Under broader constructions, more subject matter
falls under the breadth of the claim that could be anticipated, obvious, or

88

See Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027.

89

See id.

90

See id.
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unsupported by the application's specification.91 If a claim captures subject
matter that is any of these, the claim is invalid.92 Referring to Figure 1, the
diagram depicts the extra scope in gray, and if any prior art either anticipates or
renders obvious this additional gray material, the claim is invalid. 93 Essentially,
the correlation is that the broader the interpreted scope is, the higher the
likelihood of rejection.
Not only does the BRI standard make rejections more likely, it also
means that some rejections are, in fact, incorrect. They are incorrect because the
prior art or an obvious variation of the prior art only falls within the claim scope
that exists under the USPTO's interpretation of the claim-the gray area in
Figure 1. Under the normal claim interpretation methodology applied by district
courts, the claim is valid because it does not capture this unpatentable subject
matter. 94 However, upon initial examination of the application, the USPTO takes
a broader view of the claim's meaning, as required by the BRI standard, and
finds that the claim is invalid. The BRI standard can thus cause the USPTO to
reject an application as unpatentable when, in fact, the application contained a
patentable invention that the Office should have issued.
The BRI standard has the real possibility of creating Type II errors, false
negatives, by falsely triggering rejections when no real patentability issue exists. 95
One rationale for using the BRI, and thereby allowing more Type II errors, may
be the prevention of Type I errors, or false positives, i.e., invalid patents that may
issue when the USPTO gives pending claims too narrow of an interpretation.96
The problem with angling the system to avoid Type I errors at the expense of
Type II errors is that mechanisms are already in place to solve Type I errors, but
no such mechanisms exist for Type II errors. The USPTO, and the courts, can
remedy incorrectly issued patents-Type I errors-in a variety of ways, such as
91

See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 66
HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 7, on file with authors).

92

Id.

93

See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 54, at 201.

94

See Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027.

95

The court seems much more concerned with "reducing the possibility that
claims, finally allowed, will be given [a] broader scope than is justified," see
In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571, 222 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 934, 936 (Fed.
Cir. 1984), than with inappropriate rejections of inventions that are actually
patentable when construed under the normal standard.

96

See id.; supra Part II.B.l.
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through reexamination, reissue, or invalidation.97 Type II errors, in contrast,
cannot be resolved under the current system. Once the USPTO deems a patent
application as unpatentable, there is no recourse. Certainly, an applicant can
argue the rejection, appeal the rejection to the Board, or appeal the final USPTO
ruling to the Federal Circuit and eventually to the Supreme Court. 98 The BRI
standard will apply, however, throughout the entire appellate review process. 99
Under the current law, all avenues would continue to apply the BRI standard, so
if the USPTO incorrectly deems the claim invalid due to a broad claim scope, that
incorrect interpretation never changes throughout the review process. JOO Thus,
Type II errors that directly result from the BRI standard are irreversible, and
even invited, under the current system, whereas the system has extensive
mechanisms for correcting Type I errors.JOI This disparity makes tilting the
interpretation methodology at the USPTO (by mandating the use of the BRI
standard) toward the creation of Type II errors to prevent Type I errors even
more irrational.
To compound the problem, recent changes in patentability case law
make Type II errors more likely. For example, the Supreme Court's decision in
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. gives examiners additional avenues for
establishing a pending patent claim as obvious. 102 Examiners can now establish
obviousness even if there was no teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine
the prior art.103 Examiners, for example, can rely on "common sense," the
97

35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006) (allowing for the reissue of defectively issued patents);
id. § 282 (providing district courts with the ability to invalidate claims); id. §
301 (setting forth the basis for ex parte reexamination proceedings); id. § 311
(describing inter partes reexamination).

98

Id. § 134 (providing appeal to the Board); id. § 141 (providing appeal to the
Federal Circuit).

99

See, e.g., Morris, 127 F.3d at 1053-54, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027 (applying
the BRI standard in an appeal to the Federal Circuit from the Board, who
had affirmed an examiner's rejection under the BRI). Also, pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 145 (2006), the applicant could appeal to the district court from the
Board and the BRI standard would continue to apply.

100

This fact is demonstrated by the examples set forth below. See infra Part IV.

101

See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495, 1500 (2001) (pointing out that litigation may be a better way to weed
out bad patents).

102

550 U.S. 398, 419, 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1397 (2007).

103

Id. at 419, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396-97.
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"ordinary creativity of the PHOSITA," or market demand.104 Combining the
relaxed standard for non-obviousness with an overly broad claim scope makes it
much more likely that claims will be rejected as obvious under § 103.105 This
Type II error, stemming from the BRI standard, cannot be corrected- it follows
the patent application throughout the examination process.
Accordingly, the BRI standard creates an odd situation: a patent
applicant must fight to have subject matter allowed that she will not be able to
enforce in court. Referencing Figure 1, an inventor must prove that the gray area
is patentable to get into the larger white circle, but will never be able to exclude
others from practicing the gray area.106

E.

The BRI Standard Forces Costly Amending of Patent Claims

Additional policy positions in support of the BRI standard suggest that
the standard does no real harm to the applicant because she can simply amend
the claims in response to the interpretation and, in tum, achieve the
interpretation she desires. 107 Amending claims, however, carries a recognizable
cost that has a real impact on the inventor's rights and pocketbook, as well as on
society in generai.10s

104

Id. at 419, 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397. "PHOSITA" stands for person
having ordinary skill in the art.

105

See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the
Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 991 (2008) ("The
greater focus on the characteristics of individual cases suggests a need for
evidence and factual determinations, but the legal and structural framework
under which obviousness is tested means that it is difficult to make and
review those determinations. The realistic approach is also incomplete,
because the obviousness inquiry depends critically on the counterfactual
assumption that the PHOSITA, while ordinarily skilled, is perfectly
informed about the prior art.").

106

Perhaps the inventor will be able to exclude others from practicing the
subject matter contained within that gray area via the doctrine of
equivalents (DOE). There is no linkage, however, between the subject
matter captured by the DOE and that examined because of the BRI.

107

See supra Part 11.B.2.

108

Professor Risch even argues that the BRI standard can lead to "a greater
number of unclear amendments." See, Risch, supra note 4, at 195.
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First, amendment, by definition, constricts the patentee's rights. Most
amendments restrict the scope of equivalents afforded to a patent claim. 109 The
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, in most cases, causes amended claims to
lose the possibility of obtaining any equivalents. 110 If the BRI standard is meant
to prompt amendment, then the standard forces applicants to forgo some
equivalence protection.
Second, amendments go hand-in-hand with additional USPTO and
attorney costs. Given the complexities of claim drafting, preparing amendments
requires potentially significant amounts of costly attorney time. 111 Amendments
also prompt additional negotiations with the USPTO and may be filed with a
request for continued examination, which entails still more attorney time and
additional filing fees. 112 Likewise, amendments can force a given round of
prosecution to end immediately, allowing the examiner to issue a final office
action.m
This result has special significance because of the pending continuation
rules, which limit the ability to continue prosecution after final action. 114 If the
109

See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736,
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1711-12 (2002) ("We agree with the Court of
Appeals that a narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement of
the Patent Act may give rise to an estoppel.").

110

See id. at 737, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.

111

See, e.g., AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2007 I-79 to I-80 (finding
the average cost of a single argument or amendment to a patent application
to be between $1,920 and $3,680, depending on the type and complexity of
patent application). This cost is beyond the initial amount that is spent to
prepare and file the original application, averaging $7,012-12,393 or more.
Id. at I-78.

112

See 35 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2006); 37 C.F.R. § l.17(e) (2008) (detailing the cost of
filing a request for continued examination (RCE), currently at $810 for
someone other than a small entity); 37 C.F.R. § 1.114 (2008) (providing
specifics for the RCE filing process).

113

See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a); 37 C.F.R. § 1.113 (2008) (indicating when an examiner
can issue a final rejection).

114

See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of
Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716-46,843 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) [hereinafter Changes]. The validity of the rules
is still in flux, with some aspects of the rules invalidated because they
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rules come into force, the amendments eat into a patentee's opportunity to file
continuations. 115 Once the available continuations run out, the applicant no
longer has an available measure to remedy the broadest interpretation, leaving
the applicant with a claim meaning that does not reflect the same meaning a
district court would have given the claim. 11 6
Third, the requirement to amend also necessarily prolongs prosecution,
generating more of a delay. This delay adds to the backlog at the USPTO, which
has its own negative impact on patent quality.m The delay also harms
competitors who then have to wait longer for the patent's final issuance and the
accompanying information as to what scope of exclusivity they must avoid. 118
Fourth, the argument that an applicant must amend to clarify claim
meaning ignores the import of statements made during prosecution regarding
claim interpretation. 119 There is no need to force the applicant to amend the
patent claims. Statements as to claim term meaning may have equal force as
amendments without causing some of the same negative consequences. 120 An
conflict with 35 U.S.C. § 120. See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1364-65, 90
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1142-43 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (remanding the rule
challenge to the district court), vacated 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(granting a rehearing en bane).
115

See Changes, supra note 114.

11 6

See supra Part III.D.

117

See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 57, at 46 (identifying the USPTO's
resource problem affecting their effective reviewability of the growing
number of applications).

118

Patents perform a disclosure function, allowing competitors to design
around claimed subject matter. See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim
Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 40 (2000) ("As the term 'designaround' suggests, a competitor of the patentee may purposefully circumvent
the boundaries of the patent claim and create a competitive, non-infringing
alternative to the claimed invention.").

119

See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("In addition to consulting the specification, we have
held that a court 'should also consider the patent's prosecution history, if it is
in evidence."' (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,
980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1995))).

120

Id. Prosecution history statements can also limit equivalence. See Conoco,
Inc. v. Energy & Envtl. Int'l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1363, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1801, 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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examiner can resolve any ambiguity simply by asking the applicant to clarify and
then putting the response on the record. 121 This course is preferable to broadly
interpreting the claim and then forcing the applicant to respond with a costly
amendment. Moreover, as previously argued, the BRI standard can actually
have the opposite effect with regard to creating a prosecution history as to claim
meaning. 122 The BRI standard allows examiners to avoid discussions of claim
meaning-particularly, discussions in the same terms as will take place in district
court. 123

The BRI Standard ls Fatally Ambiguous

F.

Finally, the case law provides little to no guidance on the contours of the
BRI standard. It is difficult to find examples or additional verbiage in Federal
Circuit case law that demonstrate how examiners are to implement the BRI

standard. The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure's (MPEP) description of
claim interpretation during prosecution contains no further instructions specific
to employing the BRI. 124 The interpretation section, MPEP section 2111, begins
by instructing examiners to give pending claims their "broadest reasonable
interpretation." 125 The section goes on to provide no examples, no tests, and no
direction to examiners on how to implement or employ this standard. 126 The rest
of section 2111 then recites the same methodology used in district courts to
interpret claims.127
The case law regarding claim interpretation actually cited in the MPEP
exemplifies general claim interpretation principles that apply during both
prosecution and enforcement proceedings, but it does not elaborate on the
121

Conoco, 460 F.3d at 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812. To invoke argumentbased estoppel, however, "the prosecution history must evince a 'clear and
unmistakable surrender of subject matter."' Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow
Commc'n Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1316, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1489
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc.,
170 F.3d 1373, 1377, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).

122

See supra Part III.C.

123

Id.

124

See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, MANUAL
2111 (2007).

PROCEDURE§
125

Id.

126 See id.
127

See id.
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specifics of the BRI standard unique to the USPT0.12s Other than the mantra
"broadest reasonable interpretation," there is simply no articulation of how to
accomplish this step other than that it should be consistent with the teachings in
the specification. 129
Should the examiner first determine the correct
interpretation of the claims and then slightly broaden this interpretation? How
exactly is this accomplished and to what end?
Finally, the BRI standard has a troubling circularity. When does the
examiner stop giving claims the BRI gloss? The case law seems to assume that
once the claims are amended, everything becomes static. Under the letter of the
law, however, it seems that even amended language needs to be given a BRI,
which broadens the amended claims beyond their actual meaning. 130
Presumably, the applicant responds by amending again and the process never
stops. Admittedly, in practice, the process of broad interpretation probably stops
after an iteration or two. No authority officially indicates, however, when it
should end; the door is open for multiple applications of the BRI standard to the
same claim language, regardless of whether the applicant amends it.
IV.

RECENT CASES EXEMPLIFYING THE PROBLEMS WITH THE BRI STANDARD

A.

In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp. - Lack of a Singular
Definition of Invention and the Introduction of Horizontal
Inequity

The Federal Circuit's recent decision in In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp.
exemplifies how application of the BRI standard results in different definitions of
the same claim term by the USPTO and a district court. 131 In Trans Texas, the
district court gave the claims at issue a particular meaning, but the USPTO,
during a reexamination that occurred after the district court's claim construction,
gave the claims a different meaning based on the BRI standard, which the
Federal Circuit then affirmed. 132

128

See id.

129

See id.

130

See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

131

See 498 F.3d 1290, 1292, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835, 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

132

See id.
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The patent at issue in Trans Texas addressed a system of inflationadjusted deposit and loan accounts. 133 In a pending patent litigation, the district
court construed certain claims and, in due course, the parties to that litigation
reached a settlement before trial. 134 The district court dismissed the case with
prejudice. 135 After the district court had issued the claim construction order, the
patent holder filed a request for reexamination of the patents at issue. 136 The
USPTO granted the request and reexamination commenced. 137 During the
reexamination, the applicant argued that the district court's claim interpretation
bound the USPT0. 138 The USPTO, however, denied this request and, under its
interpretation using the BRI standard, found certain claims invalid as obvious. 139
The applicant appealed the resulting rejection in the reexamination,
arguing again that the USPTO must follow the district court's earlier claim
interpretation. 140 The Federal Circuit did not agree, noting that the USPTO was
not a party to the earlier action, so there was no issue preclusion as to the
question of claim interpretation before the USPTO in the reexamination. 141
The Federal Circuit then reviewed the USPTO's claim interpretation,
focusing on whether the "[c]laims [were] given 'their broadest reasonable
interpretation, consistent with the specification, in reexamination
proceedings."' 142 Under this standard, the Federal Circuit agreed with the
USPTO's interpretation even though it was broader than the district court's
earlier interpretation of the same claims. 143

133

Id.

134

Id. at 1294-95, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.

135

Id. at 1295, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.

136

Id. at 1294, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.

137

Id.

138

Id.

139

Id. at 1295, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.

140

Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839.

141

Id. at 1297, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.

142

Id. at 1298, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841 (quoting In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d
1569, 1571, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 934, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).

143

See id. at 1299, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841 (holding that the USPTO did not
err by interpreting "responsive to the rate of inflation" as not limited to a
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This differential created by the BRI-the district court giving the claims a
different meaning than the USPTO-creates, in essence, two different inventions.
Yet the application contains only one set of claims and, in turn, only singular
inventions are at issue. The scope and definition of these inventions should not
change between the venues. Application of the BRI standard allows for this
inconsistency and even demands it in some cases, as demonstrated in Trans
Texas. As noted earlier, such a result contradicts the patent statutes. 144
The result in Trans Texas also demonstrates the horizontal inequity
introduced by the BRI standard. 145 The same claims have different meanings
depending on the venue of the court interpreting them. 146 This inequity occurs
even post-issuance, when claims are reexamined after district court litigation.
This practice introduces uncertainty as to a claim's validity and, ultimately,
enforceability, depending on which venue performs the claim interpretation. A
patent claim may be valid in district court under normal interpretation
methodology, but invalid upon a USPTO reexamination because of the BRI. 147
B.

In re Graves - Improper Denial of Patent Protection

The Federal Circuit's decision in In re Graves provides a clear example of
how the use of the BRI standard can cause the USPTO to deny improperly patent
protection. 148 The court affirmed an anticipation rejection of claims that were

one-to-one relationship); id. at 1294, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838 (noting the
district court's interpretation of "responsive to the rate of inflation" as
clearly imparting a one-to-one correlation).
144

See supra Part III.A.

s See supra Part III.B.

14

146

See id.

147

This lack of horizontal equity presents a very interesting, and plausible,
scenario. A patentee may successfully enforce a patent claim in district
court, but the alleged infringer could pursue a reexamination and
subsequently invalidate the patent claim when interpreted under the BRIan analysis that the district court would never have performed under
normal claim interpretation rules.

148

See 69 F.3d 1147, 1152, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1697, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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given their BRI. 149 The dissent in Graves pointed out that, under a narrower
interpretation, the claims would have been allowable. 150
The invention at issue in Graves was a device and method for testing an
electrical system for wire shorts. 151 Three independent claims remained in the
pending application when it was appealed to the Board, who then affirmed the
rejection under§ 102(b). 152 On appeal to the Federal Circuit, these rejections were
at issue and their validity hinged on the interpretation of the following claim
element:
(b) simultaneously monitoring the selected multiple connection
points or wires for presence of the test signal which is applied
sequencially [sic] to each point on the interconnect of the system
under test[. ]1 53
The examiner and the Board employed the BRI standard and found the
limitation to mean that "the simultaneous monitoring of input and output points,
but not necessarily the simultaneous monitoring of an input point and multiple
output points." 154 A majority at the Federal Circuit agreed. 155 The court, staying
true to the application of the BRI standard, found that this interpretation gave
the claim element "as broad a reading as possible not inconsistent with the
applicant's disclosure."156
The dissent, authored by Judge Nies, offered a different, narrower
construction of the limitation. The dissent found that "element (b) requires the
simultaneous monitoring of each of multiple connection points or wires (i.e.,
each of multiple output points)." 157 Judge Nies came to this construction because,
otherwise, "the word 'simultaneously' is rendered superfluous." 158 She then
149 Id. at 1148-49, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
150

See id. at 1154, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1702 (Nies, J., dissenting).

15 1

Id. at 1149, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.

152

Id.

153

Id. at 1151, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700.

54 Id. at 1152, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.

1

155

Id.

156

Id.

157

Id.

158

Id. at 1153, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1702 (Nies, J., dissenting).

AIPLA Q.J.

314

Vol. 37:285

noted that "[i]t is axiomatic that, in a continuity test of a wire, one must monitor
the connection point at the same time the test signal is applied." 159 Judge Nies
also pointed to parts of the specification that supported this narrower
construction. 160
Under the narrower construction, the claims were not
antici pated. 161
The application of the BRI standard by the majority in Graves exemplifies
the possibility that the use of the standard will deny patent protection for claims
that, given their "normal" construction, are actually valid. 162 The difference
between the majority and the dissent's constructions is that the majority
construes the claims more broadly, citing the BRI standard for support. 163 If the
majority had not applied the BRI standard, they may have agreed with the
dissent; and the claims would have survived scrutiny. Applying the BRI
standard forced the majority to judge the validity of an invention with a broader
claim scope, which captured subject matter that was not novel. 164 Referring back
to Figure 1, 165 the anticipating reference in Graves fell within the gray area
captured by only the BRI standard. Put another way, the decision in Graves was
a Type II error-just the type of irreversible, erroneous rejection of an invention
that the BRI standard invites. 166 Hence, the BRI standard has a direct link to the
denial of patentability for claims that would be valid if scrutinized under the
normal interpretation methodology employed in litigation.
This reading of Graves is open to critique. The majority in Graves did
conclude, in the alternative, that the claims would have been anticipated even
under the narrower interpretation of the dissent. 167 That is, the prior art actually
fell within the white part of Figure 1 and, thus, would have anticipated the
invention under both the BRI and the normal interpretation. If true, the BRI
standard created harmless error. The dissent, however, contested the majority's

1s9

Id.

160

Id.

161

Id. at 1154, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1702 (Nies, J., dissenting).

162

See supra Part III.D.

163

See Graves, 69 F.3d at 1152, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.

164

See id.

165

See supra Part III.D.

166

See id.

167

Graves, 69 F.3d at 1152, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
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conclusion. 16s Regardless of the situation in Graves, the fact that the BRl standard
creates a harmless rejection of the pending claims in one case does not mean such
BRl-prompted rejections are harmless in all cases. One also has to wonder if the
majority made this alternative holding to take some of the sting out of the
inequity of applying the BRl standard in this case. In other words, the BRl
standard may force courts to articulate alternative justifications for their holdings
because of the inequitable and unjustifiable harm the BRl standard imposes on
applicants.
One may also read Graves as a case in which both the majority and
dissent apply the same BRl standard but arrive at different conclusions. This
may be true, but the majority's interpretation is a broader BRl than the
dissent's. 169 The majority also made a point of citing BRI case law to support its
interpretation. 170 Moreover, if Graves simply demonstrates an intra-circuit
dispute as to the meaning of the BRl, then the inconsistent conclusions reached
prove the final problem with the BRl standard-that it is hopelessly
ambiguous. 171 In re Buszard, described below, exemplifies this problem in more
detail.172

Graves, similar to Trans Texas, also exemplifies the BRI standard's
unseemly ability to generate a different definition of an invention than normal
claim interpretation. 173 The majority in Graves, taking the BRl approach, reached
a different definition of the claim limitation at issue than the dissent, who took a
narrower view of the limitation's meaning. 174
The difference between the majority's interpretation and the dissent's
interpretation also shows the BRI standard's disruption to horizontal equity and
certainty in patent law, which are goals of the Federal Circuit. 175 If this was an
appeal from a district court decision, the absence of the BRl standard would

168

Id. at 1153-54, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1702 (Nies, J., dissenting).

169

See id. at 1152, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.

170

Id.

171

See supra Part III.F.

172

See 504 F.3d 1364, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2007); infra Part IV.C.

173

See supra Part III.D.

174

See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.

175

See supra Part III.B.
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likely have put the majority and dissent on the same page as to claim meaningthe dissent's.
In re Buszard -Ambiguity in the BRI Standard

C.

The Federal Circuit's recent decision in In re Buszard provides another
good example of the ambiguity in the BRI standard and the uncertainty its
application generates. 176 The factual situation in Buszard was very similar to that
in Graves: the appropriateness of an anticipation rejection of pending claims
hinged on whether the USPTO correctly interpreted the claims at issue. 177 In
Buszard, the majority and dissent were both more explicit about using the BRI
standard, although the dissent claimed the majority did not correctly apply the
standard in its review of the USPTO's interpretation. 178
The technology at issue in Buszard was a flame retardant composition
that contained flexible polyurethane foam. 179 The claim term at issue was a
"flexible polyurethane foam reaction mixture." 18° The prior art disclosed a rigid
polyurethane foam that, when crushed, loses its rigidity because it breaks up into
small particles. 181 The USPTO interpreted the claim term "flexible polyurethane
foam" to include the earlier disclosed rigid foam because the claim term included
"any reaction mixture which produces, at least ultimately, a flexible polyurethane
foam." 182
The applicant argued that those skilled in the art know that "a flexible
polyurethane foam reaction mixture is different from a rigi~ polyurethane foam
reaction mixture" and thus the claim term was not anticipated. 183 At oral
argument before the Federal Circuit, the USPTO agreed that one skilled in the art
knows that flexible polyurethane foams have a different chemical structure and
produce different chemical reactants than rigid foams. 184 Regardless, the USPTO

176

See 504 F.3d at 1364, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
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Id. at 1366, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.

178

Id. at 1369, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752 (Prost, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 1365-66, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749-50.

180

Id. at 1366, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (internal quotations omitted).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
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Id.
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argued that the claims encompassed rigid foams when the BRI standard was
properly applied.tss
The majority agreed with the applicant's argument that the claims cannot
encompass rigid foam because the claims and specification "specifically state the
requirement of a flexible polyurethane foam reaction mixture." 186 Trying to stay
true to the BRI standard, the majority concluded that, although the USPTO's
interpretation was broad, it was not "reasonable," and thus they reversed the
USPTO's rejection.t87
The dissent, however, asserted that the majority failed to properly apply
the BRI standard. 188 Under the dissent's application of the BRI standard, in
absence of an explicit definition of "flexible polyurethane foam" in the
specification, the term must be given its broadest interpretation. 189 The dissent
concluded that the USPTO's interpretation met the standard-it was "broad," and
it was also not unreasonable. 190 This interpretation would have rendered the
claims invalid. 191 The dissent pointed out in its conclusion that if the applicant
"seeks a specific claim interpretation, he should amend his claim so it conveys his
intended meaning."192
The disagreement between the majority and dissent in Buszard
exemplifies the last problem with the BRI standard: the ambiguity of the
standard and the uncertainty it produces. Both the majority and the dissent cited
the same BRI standard; and they both looked at the claim language and the
specification, yet they came up with different claim interpretations. 193 Unlike in
Graves, the majority and dissent applied the same BRI standard. 194 They

18s Id.
t86

Id.

187 Id.
188

Id. at 1368, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751 (Prost, J., dissenting).

189 Id. (Prost, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 1369, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752 (Prost, J., dissenting).
19 1

Id. (Prost, J., dissenting).

192

Id. at 1370-71, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1754 (Prost, J., dissenting).

193 Compare id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751, with id. at 1370, 84
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (Prost, J., dissenting).
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nonetheless reached different results due to a difference of opinion as to whether
the USPTO's interpretation was "reasonable."195
The BRI standard creates this additional battleground in the
interpretation process-even after the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence is
evaluated, there can still be a dispute over the reasonableness of the resulting
interpretation. The lack of any metric that defines what is reasonable in this
situation causes the majority and dissent to point fingers, using such imprecise
phrases as "not reasonable" 196 or "not unreasonable."19 7 The BRI standard is not
robust enough to contribute to the discussion; it only increases disagreement
among judges, examiners, and other observers.
One could read Buszard as a case simply about a failure of the majority to
apply the BRI standard at all, as opposed to one about the uncertainty in
applying the BRI standard. The dissent certainly made this claim, stating that the
"majority's opinion pays lip service to this precedent," the BRI standard, "[but]
does not apply it in this case." 19s If so, then Buszard is like Graves, providing
another example of how the BRI standard can improperly deny patent protection
to a pending claim. The majority may have had to go out of its way to pay lip
service to, but ultimately avoid, the BRI standard-in contradiction of case lawto allow the claims. Put another way, the claims are patentable under normal
claim interpretation methodology, but become invalid when broadened.
Although the result was not disastrous in Buszard-the applicant got her patent
just as she presumably would have under the narrower "normal" standard-the
dissent contends that the USPTO should have denied the patent if it had
correctly applied the BRI standard. 199 Buszard is another example of how the BRI
standard can lead to denial of patent protection on a claim that would be
allowable in district court. Specifically, if one more judge had agreed with the
dissent's conclusion to deny patent protection in this case, it would have created
a Type II error.200
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Compare id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751, with id. at 1370, 84
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (Prost, J., dissenting).
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197
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If the dissent is correct in that Buszard is a case about the majority failing
to apply the BRI standard, then the case also demonstrates how the standard
generates different meanings of the invention. 201 The BRI standard changes the
way an interpreter looks at intrinsic evidence such as the claim and the
specification. It forces the examiner to give the claim language a broad meaning,
even if, as the USPTO admitted in the case, the meaning is not the one given to
the term by those skilled in the art. 202 The claims then have a meaning that is
different from the one a district court would give them. In the same vein, there is
no equitable treatment of the claims between the USPTO and in district court.
V.

CONCLUSION

The BRI standard has probably lasted this long because its propriety has
not been closely questioned. Scrutiny leads to the conclusion that there is simply
no justification for the "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard. In fact, the
standard has the potential to do significant harm. The BRI standard is a judicial
construction created by the CCPA and currently used by the Federal Circuit. The
Federal Circuit should stop using the standard and officially adopt a unitary
approach to claim interpretation, regardless of forum. Appeals from cases such
as the recent Board opinion in Miyazaki provide a great vehicle for making such a
change.
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See supra Part II.A.
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Buszard, 503 F.3d at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.

